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Public Lectures on Structural Econometrics - CEMMAP masterclass - 06/03/21 - Shared screen with speaker view
Robert Miller
13:16
http://comlabgames.com/structuraleconometrics/
Giuseppe Forte
01:01:14
Bob mentioned winners having highest valuation - could winners not just have gotten the alarm whereas others did not? are they not highest valuation sometimes? or do we assume that the probability of the alarm goes to 1 as the auction gets to its end?
Giuseppe Forte
01:01:27
minor point I may have missed
Giuseppe Forte
01:15:02
please go on
Naouar el khadiri
02:01:12
how come the expected value of the winner exeeds the upper bound? am I missing smtg?
Naouar el khadiri
02:01:28
in pre-2008
Alex P. Arsenault-Morin
02:03:10
I think this 0.63 is in a uniform price auction, so that is the inefficiency
Elena Pastorino
02:03:36
@Naouar: the comparison is between the upper bound on valuations in the actual action and the average valuation in a uniform price action
Elena Pastorino
02:04:24
Does it make sense?
Naouar el khadiri
02:04:49
thank you, I need to review the slide. I am a bit slow. sorry
Elena Pastorino
02:05:25
@Naouar: all questions are good. no need to be sorry about anything!